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PRIVATE LIFE? 
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Abstract. Over recent years, a whole new process known as data mining, equivalent to 
automated techniques processing large sets of data in order to extract patterns, 
relationships, trends and other information not traceable through usual ‘human’ 
reading, has been largely gaining in repute. 
By taking advantage of the seemingly indefinite opportunities enabled by 
applications of data mining techniques, various fields of scientific or medical research, 
business transactions, state-related and other security-concerned activities, could gain 
unprecedented benefits. However, notwithstanding established data protection 
principles reserved also for biometric information, data mining practices, inherently 
intrusive in the private sphere of individuals, have generated various concerns and 
controversy. 
As these emerging technological developments create new challenges to the 
protection of personal data, including primarily the most sensitive category of biometric 
data, the effectiveness of the concept of privacy under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and of the existing EU data protection legislation in securing 
an adequate legal framework is facing a new ordeal. 
This paper seeks to review, especially in the aftermath of the recent 
Luxembourg Court’s case law, whether evolving data mining practices materialize the 
need of adjusting the legal treatment of biometric data protection. 
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Ι. Data mining of biometric data: gains and losses 
 
A. Defining Data Mining  
 
The data mining (or pattern mining) process1 is an interdisciplinary subfield of 
computer science which results in the computational –or automated– extraction of 
understandable patterns in large volume of data sets, also referred to as ‘big data’. The 
process combines statistics and artificial intelligence tools with database management, 
so as to obtain previously unknown information. 
As it is based on modeling techniques2 which focus on extracting rules describing 
specific patterns within the data –e.g. models, sequential associations, etc.–, the results’ 
reliability is closely dependent on the source and number of the collected information, 
since a wrong input will inevitably result in a wrong output.3 
According to the types of knowledge they seek to find, modeling techniques used 
in data mining are divided in two main categories:  
(a) The descriptive modeling, based on clustering or association rule mining, which 
aims at extracting patterns or discovering hidden relationships (i.e. summary 
statistics, anomaly detection, etc.) among large data sets divided into random 
groups, and  
(b) The predictive modeling, standing on classification and regression 
analysis,4aiming at predicting previously unknown or hidden data, which can 
be decisive for scientific progress in fields like medicine or pharmaceuticals. In 
                                                          
1 Zhang Y., ‘TIETS34 Seminar: Data Mining on Biometric identification’ ,Computer Science, School of 
Information Sciences’ University of Tampere, 
<http://www.uta.fi/sis/tie/seminarbi/schedule/Introduction%20I.pdf.> accessed 13 November 2017. 
2 “Modeling is simply the act of building a model in one situation where you know the answer and then 
applying it to another situation that you don't (…)”.You note these similarities and build a model that 
includes the characteristics that are common [to the ones you found in similar situations]. With these 
models in hand you sail off looking [for the same results] where your model indicates it most likely 
might be given a similar situation in the past. Hopefully, if you've got a good model, you [will] find 
(…).Once the model is built it can then be used in similar situations where you don't know the answer”, 
Thearling K., ‘Information about analytics and data science / An Introduction to Data Mining’ (2012) 
<http://www.thearling.com/text/dmwhite/dmwhite.html>  accessed 13 November 2017. 
3 See for data mining applications in medicine Esfandiari N., Reza Babavalian M., Eftekhari Moghadam 
A.-M. &Kashani Tabar V., ‘Knowledge discovery in medicine: Current issue and future trend’ [2014],41 
Expert Systems with Applications 4434. 
4 Regression analysis is a statistical technique that estimates and predicts relations between variables. 
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that case, the groups are predefined and the search is targeted at finding patterns 
explaining the differences among them. 
Data mining, believed to be free from human bias inherent in the study of small 
amounts of data, is based on the collection –or enrollment– of various types of 
information that has been greatly facilitated by substantial technological advancements, 
like the significant expansion of computer storage capacities. Some of data mining 
applications appear quite promising and have, therefore, become increasingly popular, 
in a variety of fields, including business transactions (e-commerce and e-banking, 
CRM-Customer Relationship Management, insurance, retail), research activities 
(astronomy, clinical medicine, genetic data analyzing) and state security (financial 
fraud or credit card fraud detection, based on the consumer’s purchasing behavior 
pattern5 , border control or detection of criminal and terrorist activities). 
However, as a result of technological boundaries, the data mining techniques aren’t 
completely reliable.6 Errors might occur due to the incorrect integration of data into a 
data set, or due to the integration of missing data, wrong data or non-standard 
representation of the same data (named dirty data). In addition to that, the design and 
functionality –i.e. the technology’s purpose, which is always adapted to a specific 
context of use7– of the data mining algorithms themselves8will usually “reﬂect the 
values of [their] designer[s] (…) if only to the extent that a particular design is preferred 
(by the designer)as the best or most efficient option”.9  
                                                          
5 See, for instance, an application of data mining techniques by the Gemalto Assurance Hub, to detect 
frauds in the context of online banking services,  ‘La biométrie et le « machine learning »: la combinaison 
gagnante de Gemalto pour plus de confiance dans les services bancaires en ligne’(2017) 
<https://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Biometrie-et-machine-learning-La-combinaison-gagnante-de-
Gemalto-pour-plus-de-confiance-dans-les-services-bancaires.aspx> accessed 13 November 2017. 
6Pointedly, “At Frankfurt Airport, a system with an FRR of 1 % would produce more than 1,000 false 
alarms per day”, See Hornung G., ‘The European Biometric Passports: Legislative Procedures, Political 
Interactions, Legal Framework and Technical Safeguards’ [2007] 4 SCRIPT ED 257. 
7 “It thus cannot be assumed that an observer’s interpretation will correctly reﬂect the perception of the 
actor rather than the biases of the interpreter”, Mittelstadt B.D., Allo P., Taddeo M., Wachter S. and 
Floridi L.,‘The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate’[2016] Big Data & Society, 
1,<https://www.academia.edu/29344788/The_Ethics_of_Algorithms_Mapping_the_Debate>, accessed 
13 November 2017. 
8 “The most commonly used techniques in data mining are: Artificial neural networks, Decision trees, 
Genetic algorithms, Nearest neighbor method, Rule induction etc.”, Thearling K., supra note 2.  
9 “Development is not a neutral, linear path; there is no objectively correct choice at any given stage of 
development, but many possible choices (Johnson, 2006)”, Mittelstadt B.D., supra note 7. 
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In this context, the purpose driving data collection and use (e.g. medical data banks 
can be used for public health purposes or scientific research), as well as the identity of 
the collector, play a major role.10  
B. Data Μining applications in biometric data 
 
Inevitably, the development of these cutting-edge technological advancements 
paved the way of the application of data mining methodology in biometric data. 
Biometrics are defined as “the measurement and analysis of unique 
physical(fingerprints or hand geometry, facial thermogram, iris, retinal pattern etc.) or 
behavioral characteristics(like human voice, keystroke dynamics11 helpful in finding 
out passwords’ or personal identification numbers’ frauds etc.), especially as a means 
of verifying personal identity”.12 
Biometric data are unique to each person and of a permanent character as they 
cannot be modified nor be susceptible to alteration. In addition to that, they are 
collectable and quantitatively measurable, as they can be easily scanned and quantified 
by sensors.13 Due to the said specific features, they are considered to be more reliable 
in verifying a person’s identity. 
In practice, biometric sensors scan individuals’ characteristics to create a digital 
representation which will be further processed by a feature extractor in order to 
generate a template (i.e. a compact but expressive representation). The templates are 
then stored in a central database or recorded on movable devices, like magnetic cards, 
biometric passports, visas or smartcards. They can be analyzed alone or in combination 
with other types of data–through multimodal biometric systems– in order to treat 
                                                          
10 For instance, a private company is more likely to use information, extracted e.g. from employees’ 
database,for commercial purposes, than a public entity. 
11Gutierrez F., Lerma-Rascon M., Salgado-Garza L. and Dr. Cantu F., ‘Biometrics and Data Mining: 
Comparison of Data Mining – Based Keystroke Dynamics Methods for Identity Verification in MICAI 
'02 Proceedings of the Second Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in 
Artificial Intelligence, (2002 Springer). 
12See relatively the definition of the Merriam-Webster scientific dictionary <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/biometrics > , accessed 13 November 2017. 
13See inter alia Jain A., Hong L., Pankanti S., ‘Biometric identification’ [2000], 43 Communications of 
the ACM , 91. See, also, Hernández-Aguilar J.A., Zavala C., Díaz O., Burlak G., Ochoa A. and César 
Ponce J., ‘Biometric Data Mining Applied to On-line Recognition Systems’ in Midori Albert (eds), 
Biometrics - Unique and Diverse Applications in Nature, Science, and Technology (In tech 2011). 
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together different properties of the same identifier or different perceptions of the same 
identifier as perceived by different sensors.14 
Data mining technology, especially when applied to biometric data, can produce 
outstanding scientific results. 15  However, biometrics seem to be mostly used for  
verification purposes as a match comparison, named authentication (one-to-one search) 
or as an associative identification system (one-to-many search),16 where constructed 
templates are instantly and electronically checked through central databases, so as to 
verify a claimed identity and to describe, if required, a pre-registered person.17Thus, the 
consideration of biometrics as more reliable than conventional strategies for identity 
verifications led to their preferential use for commercial and –mainly– public security 
purposes. 
On the other hand, strong privacy concerns were raised by scholars for inappropriate 
use of biometric information. These concerns were mostly attributed to the nature of 
the collection and retention process, since biometric measurements are mainly collected 
in remote authentication settings, notwithstanding the fact that data mining in 
biometrics is also used for authentication purposes in other areas, not always correlating 
with public security issues. In the era of proliferation of terrorist attacks, it is 
fingerprints and other biometric information that governmental authorities are after. 
Biometric data are, nowadays, captured in travel documents of all kinds, retained at 
central repositories of such information, interconnected and, then, opened up to police 
searches. In this context, the risk of fishing expeditions, such as these aiming at finding 
criminals amongst a population of potential suspects18, or the tendency of misusing 
                                                          
14Sheeba R. and Subha M, ‘Data Mining Applications in Biometrics :Multimodel Scheme with Facial 
and Iris Recognition Based on Gabor Filter’ [2013] 2 IJERT 12. 
15“ (…) in 2000, Iceland’s parliament sold exclusive rights to all the genetic and genealogical data from 
each of its 275,000 citizens to the U.S. company de CODE Genetics. Soon thereafter, deCODE signed a 
$200 million contract with Hoffman La Roche to search for several common human genetic diseases. 
(…). The Iceland genetic database sale, for example, led to identiﬁcation of genes linked to disease (…)”, 
in Kaplan B., ‘How Should Health Data Be Used? Privacy, Secondary Use, and Big Data Sales’[2016]  
25Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics  312. 
16Baldaccini A., ‘Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects with 
Biometric Documents and Databases’[2008]  10 European Journal of Migration and Law 31. See, also, 
Sheeba R., supra note 14.  
17National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences, OPINION N° 98. France 
(2013)<http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/en/publications/biometrics-identifying-data-and-human-
rights#.Wgr6TYjQDIU> accessed 14 November 2017. 
18 This applies mainly to individuals with specific characteristics or handicaps, See also Baldaccini 
A.,supra note 16, 5.  
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biometrics referred to as a “slope leading from identification to identifying behavior”19 
rendered this constantly evolving technology as one of the most debatable scientific 
breakthroughs of the last decades.  
Hence, the widespread use of data mining technologies raised two main privacy 
issues 20 : the anonymization of biometric data and the automated character of the 
procedure. In general terms, the right to privacy is expected to be preserved through 
data anonymization techniques21 –and a new challenge for information engineers is 
presented– but the task seems to be, at the same time, unrealistic, as the available 
number of linkable data is dramatically increasing (photos, personal data, activities and 
hobbies voluntarily posted on social networks etc.).22 At the same time, when it comes 
to healthcare, responsible scientific treatment of non-anonymized biometric data could 
undoubtedly serve as the basis for better healthcare services, advancements in medical 
treatment, developments in pharmaceuticals, etc., all core issues for public interest 
concerns.  
However, despite the wide variety of beneficial results in this field,23 anonymity 
pertaining to biometric information is considered as the critical factor of preserving 
privacy. Since such data , if non-anonymised, can be easily matched with medical data 
creating personal health profiles from birth to death, the door is left open for data 
controllers or machines of modern medicine to invade the individuals’ private sphere 
with potentially detrimental effects.24  
Another issue of substantial concern emanates from the automated character of 
these practices that excludes ipso facto the fulfillment of the prior consent principle, 
basic prerequisite in data protection law. In particular, the data subject is not able to 
                                                          
19Ibid., 3. 
20Sermondadaz S., ‘Avec les Big Data et la biométrie, Big Brother s'invite au bureau, Sciences et Avenir’, 
[2017], https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/high-tech/data/avec-les-big-data-et-la-biometrie-big-brother-s-
invite-au-bureau_110644 accessed 14 November 2017. 
21 See in relation to data anonymization policies Gal T.Z., Kovacs G., Kardovacks Z., ‘Survey on privacy 
preserving data mining techniques in health care databases’ [2014] 6 Acta Univ. Sapientiae, Informatica, 
1, 33. 
22Scientists tend to argue against anonymization: “the more you try to hide sensitive private information, 
the less valuable it is for analysis (…). If personal or sensitive data (…) can only be accessed, transferred 
or handled by entities explicitly stated in regulations, and with the consent of the data subject, researchers 
working with such databases will stumble very early in the legal limitations”,Ibidem. 
23 See Kaplan,supra note 15, 319 
24  See in this respect Rajaretnam T., ‘Data Mining and Data Matching: Regulatory and Ethical 
Considerations Relating to Privacy and Confidentiality in Medical Data’ [2014] 9 J. Int't Com. L. & Tech. 
294, 300. 
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grant his/her consent to potential data mining applications, when the relevant 
information is being collected.25 
Nevertheless, as the trust placed on data mining technics can result in a “de-
responsibilisation of human actors or a tendency to hide behind the computer26”, and 
bearing in mind that legislative regulation can either boost or halt the advancement of 
science and technology, regulatory delimitation of data mining over biometric features 
should be the focus of particular legal concerns. 
Thus, aside from the most positive data mining applications used in healthcare or 
from the most intrusive ones used in governmental policies, the EU and international 
legal mechanisms are confronted with newly introduced challenges that require a 
rigorous evolution of data protection legal framework in order to tackle the detrimental 
implications of these developments for a more peaceful enjoyment of the right to private 
life. 
 
II. EU data protection standards: towards an adequate shelter for biometric 
data? 
 
A. The legislative foundations of European data protection  
 
Within the context of the ongoing technological progress and the cross-border 
exchange of information, especially via Internet, the multiple challenges posed to 
human rights in relation to the protection of personal data could not have been ignored 
by the EU legal order or the Council of Europe (CoE) system. Against this background, 
the European data protection is definitely the most luminous example of legal evolution 
during the latest decades. In response to the emerging developments in the field of 
information technology in the 1960s, the concept of privacy in the context of Art.8 of 
the ECHR, formulated in 1950, needed to be revisited in order to meet with the new 
technological advancements and to guarantee the protection of the individuals’ personal 
                                                          
25 Ibidem. 
26Zarsky T., ‘The trouble with algorithmic decisions an analytic road map to examine efficiency and 
fairness in automated and opaque decision making’ [2016] 41 Science, Technology & Human Values 
1,121. 
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data. As a response to this growing need, the Council of Europe27 adopted, at first, 
various resolutions with reference to Art.8 ECHR and, in 1981, adopted the Convention 
on Personal Data28(Convention 108), a legally binding instrument providing specific 
safeguards against abuses from private actors or the state’s authorities concerning the 
fair and lawful collection, storage and automatic processing of personal data. In this 
respect, the Strasbourg Court applied broadly the notion of private life expanding the 
protection offered by the Convention, at first, to cases related to interception of 
telephone communications (as in Klass29 in 1978 and in Malone30 judgment in 1984) 
and, progressively, to cases with regard to data stored in computers, to video-
surveillance in Peck31 or storage of such data to secret registers (as it was the case in 
Leander32 and Rotaru33). 
 This constant evolution on the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the concept 
of private life towards a more effective protection of personal data, along with the 
numerous regulatory transformations in the EU Member states fostered the conditions 
under which the EU adopted several legal instruments with the aim to harmonise the 
national data protection legislations of its Member States. To this end, the EU Data 
Protection Directive,34 adopted in 1995, was seen as “the leading force of globalizing 
data protection”35incorporating most of the principles and requirements of the CoE 
system.36The Directive was later followed by the EU Regulation 45/200137addressing 
                                                          
27CoE, Committee of Ministers (1973), Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals 
vis-a-vis electronic data banks in the private sector, 26 September 1973; CoE, Committee of Ministers 
(1974), Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-a-vis electronic data banks 
in the public sector, 20 September 1974.  
28Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to automatic processing 
of personal data, ETS No.108. 
29Klass and Others v. Germany,Application no. 5029/71, 6 September 1978 
30Malone v. the United Kingdom,Application no. 8691/79, 2 August 1984 
31 Peck v. the United Kingdom,Application no. 44647/98, 28 January 2003 
32Leander v.  Sweden,Application no. 9248/81,23 March 1987 
33Rotaru v. Romania[GC],Application no. 28341/95, 4 May 2000  
34Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data , OJ 
[1995] L 281 
35Birnhack M., The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime,(2008) 24 Computer 
Law & Security Report508, 512. 
36For the connection between the Convention 108 and the Data Protection Directive see the Handbook 
in European Data Protection,2014 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_data_protection_ENG.pdf> accessed 10 October 2017 
,p.18 
37Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the institutions and bodies 
of the Community and on the free movement of such data, [2001]OJ L 8. 
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EU legal bodies and by two more Directives covering more specified fields of the legal 
protection of personal data, namely the Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications38 and the Data Retention Directive.39Under the aforementioned legal 
framework, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in the light of the 
dynamic jurisprudence on the matter of its Strasbourg counterpart, extended the scope 
of application of the Data Protection Directive and went so far as to apply its provisions 
outside the area of the internal market.40 
However, apart from the guarantees provided by the EU soft law with regard to the 
right to data protection, its explicit recognition as a fundamental right of equivalent 
value within the EU legal framework came with the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Rights of the European Union (EU Charter or EUCFR).41 
The EU Charter, which came into force on the 1st December 2009, not only contained 
a provision pertaining to the respect for private and family life, but established 
explicitly the right to data protection as enshrined in Art.8 EUCFR.42Drafted a few 
years after the adoption of the Data Protection Directive, Art. 8 of the Charter must be 
deemed as reflecting pre-existing EU data protection law and relevant jurisprudential 
principles. In this regard, the Charter, not only ensures the right to data protection but 
establishes also key data protection principles related to the consent of the data subject, 
the establishment of independent authorities supervising the implementation of the said 
principles and the access to documents.43 
 
                                                          
38Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), [2002]OJ L 201. 
39 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC,(Data Retention Directive), [2006] OJ  L 105/54, invalidated on 8 April 2014. 
40 De Hert P.,Gurtwirth S., ‘Data protection in the case law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg : 
constitutionalisation in action’ in Gurtwirth S., Poullet Y., De Hert P., Nouwt S. , De Terwangne C. 
(eds),Reinventing Data Protection ? ,(Springer Science, Dordrecht 2009),18-19.   
41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391. The Charter was granted  
legally binding force when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
42 Article 8 of the EU Charter reads as follows: “1.Everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis 
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has 
the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.” 
43Handbook on European data protection law , European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and 
Council of Europe (2014) 20,21. 
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B. The enhanced protection of the CJEU in data protection cases 
 
 
i. Google Spain: the application of data protection rules in search engines 
 
It is in this context that the recent and famous case of Google Spain44 should be 
examined with regard to the applicability of data protection legislation to internet 
search engines. In the light of several post-Lisbon judgments 45  of the CJEU 
recognizing the valeur juridique of the EU Charter and enhancing the individuals’ 
protection through a rather strict interpretation of the data protection law, this milestone 
ruling of the Court was seen by some scholars as conferring to the data subjects the 
right to be forgotten and to control, therefore, their online reputation. Particularly, in 
Google Spain, M. Gonzalez who asked for the deletion of the published information in 
the online version of La Vanguardia newspaper regarding his personal data related to 
his participation to a real-estate auction held in 1998, alleged inter alia that when an 
internet user searched for his full name in the Google search engine, he would obtain 
access to two links to the newspaper’s website on which the announcements with his 
personal data appeared. As the publisher of La Vanguardia and Google Spain, which 
in the meantime forwarded M. Gonzalez’s request to Google Inc., denied to remove or 
rectify the relevant information, the plaintiff, addressed subsequently his complaint to 
the Spanish DPA. The latter rejected the request as far as the newspaper was concerned, 
ordering, however, Google Spain to delist the aforementioned information from its 
search results. 
 Under this factual basis, the Court was expected to pronounce on the material scope46 
of the Data Protection Directive and particularly on whether the activity of internet 
                                                          
44 Case C-131/12,Google Spain SL και Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
and  MarioCosteja González [2014]ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
45 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007,[2007] OJ C 306/1. 
46 Regarding the material scope of the Directive’s application see also Kulk S. and ZuiderveenBorgesius 
F.,‘Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of Expression?’ [2014] European 
Journal of Risk Regulation,3 ; Kuner C., ‘The Court of Justice of the EU Judgment on Data Protection 
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search engines, namely indexing automatically, storing temporarily and making 
available information published on different websites to internet users as per a 
particular order of preference47, fall within the notion of “processing personal data” 
ofArt.2(b) of the Directive. The Court found the latter applicable to search engines 
operators like Google, as it considered them controllers of the processing.48In response 
to Google’s allegations that no personal data processing relating to its search engine 
took place in Spain and that the said processing was exclusively carried out by Google 
Inc., the Court adopted an extraterritorial interpretation, when examined the territorial 
scope of the aforementioned legislation.49More precisely, the Court ruled that the 
activities of the subsidiary are “inextricably linked” to those of the search engine 
operator such as the activities of the Google headquarters in the U.S.A in view of the 
fact that these activities allow Google Inc. to be economically workable.50 
Finally, the Court was asked about the extent of the responsibility of the search 
engines operators and, therefore, the applicability in the present case of Art.12(b) and 
14(1)(a) of the Data Protection Directive establishing the right to erasure, rectification 
or blocking of the processing of personal data. Unlike the position of AG Jääskinen on 
the matter,51 according to the CJEU’s assertion these provisions should be interpreted 
as granting to the data subject the right to have a search engine delist from its search 
results the links to third parties’ websites related to his name. However, the Court 
emphasized that this right must be balanced with the legitimate interests of the internet 
searchers with regard to the relevant provisions of the Charter, namely Art.7 and Art.8.  
From the fundamental rights’ perspective, even though it is clear -especially 
after the attribution of full legal effect to the Charter- that the CJEU opting for a broader 
interpretation of the relevant legislation sought to ensure a higher level of protection 
for the EU citizens with regard to data protection law, this ruling caught many by 
surprise. In Google Spain, the Luxembourg Court definitely made some significant 
pronouncements. For the first time -and before the adoption of the General Data 
Protection Regulation- recognized explicitly the right of an individual to have his/her 
                                                          
and Internet Search Engines’, LSE  Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 3/2015  < 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61584/>  accessed 15 November 2017, 7. 
47 See Google Spain, supra note 44,paras 20-21. 
48 Ibid, para.33. 
49 Ibid, para 55. 
50 Ibid, para 56. 
51 Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Google Spain delivered on 25 June 2013. 
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personal data suppressed from the list of search results made available by an internet 
search engine pursuant to a search based on the individual’s name. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s judgment dealt with only one aspect of the right to be forgotten as enshrined 
for the first time in Art. 17 GDPR52, since it only focused on its application to internet 
search engines. It, thus, seems inaccurate to misinterpret the decision as concluding to 
a comprehensive recognition of the right to be forgotten.53 
 However, the key judgment in Google Spain captures perfectly the willingness 
of the CJEU to enhance data protection legal standards while implementing the Lisbon 
framework particularly in the light of the proposed EU General Data Protection 
Regulation54 in 2012. However, its implications raised questions as the Court seemed 
reluctant to shed light to several issues with regard to the disproportionately broad scope 
of the Directive’s application and the exercise of balancing of the individuals’ 
fundamental rights. Hence, as Kuner correctly deduced “the judgment provides a strong 
affirmation of online data protection rights, but fails to indicate a way forward for their 
effective implementation and realization, the development of which will likely be a 
struggle for data controllers, DPAs, and courts”.55 
 As previously discussed, striking the correct balance in the data protection legal 
field is not a new territory for the EU judges but now, it is under the umbrella of the  
EU Charter that this exercise will be constantly carried out and this time, not only 
between fundamental rights and EU internal market freedoms, but also between 
conflicting fundamental rights both embodied in the Charter.56 
                                                          
52 This actually constitutes one of the limitations of the judgment. Judging from the notion of Internet 
search engines as seen in the Google Spain decision, search engines like Google, Yahoo etc are covered 
but it remains unclear whether a number of others are left out. For instance the question remains open 
for websites with large-scale search function such as social networks, Internet archives, news databases, 
which are also overly used by millions of individuals.   
53See also Iglesakis I., ‘The Right To Be Forgotten in the Google Spain Case (case C-131/12): A Clear 
Victory for Data Protection or an Obstacle for the Internet? [2014] 12 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472323>accessed 12 November 2017. See also 
Supra note 46, Kuner , 7 
54  The EU General Data Protection Regulation explicitly enshrines the “right to be 
forgotten”.(Art.17)Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ EU 
L 119/1, 4 May 2016 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:TOC>accessed 11 November 2017. 
55 Supra note 46,Kuner, 21 
56 Fontanelli F.,‘The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights two years 
later’[2011]3Perspectives on Federalism 3. 
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ii. Digital Rights Ireland: the end of Data Retention Directive 
 
 The abovementioned tendency was manifestly confirmed in the landmark 
Digital Rights Ireland ruling,57in which the Luxembourg Court did not restrict itself  to 
invalidate some aspects of the EU legislation under scrutiny, but opted for striking 
down the Data Retention Directive58 in its entity. In the case at hand, the preliminary 
reference procedure, initiated by the Irish High Court and by the Austrian 
Verfassungsgerichtshof, touched upon the legality and, thus, the validity of the said 
Directive in the light of Art.7 and 8 of the Charter. In the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in Europe, the Directive placed an obligation on Internet and telephone service 
providers to retain specific types of data relating to communications of individuals for 
security purposes. These retained data were telecommunications, traffic data in regard 
to e-mails, internet access and internet telephony, location data and data needed to 
identify a subscriber or a registered user. Despite the lack of a legal basis for retaining 
the content of these telecommunications, the whole background of the Directive 
appeared problematic.59 
The Court focused, first and foremost, on the validity of the Directive at stake 
in light of the rights to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression as embodied 
in the EU Charter. After having declared the relevance of Art.7 and 8 with regard to the 
validity of the Directive, the CJEU stated that “those data, taken as a whole, may allow 
very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose 
data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary 
places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social 
relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them.”60 
                                                          
57 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12,Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
58 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 
O.J. 2006, L 105/54. 
59 See Lynksey O., ‘The Data Retention Directive is incompatible with the rights to privacy and data 
protection and is invalid in its entirety: Digital Rights Ireland, Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital 
Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitlinger and others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 
April 2014,nyr.,[2014]’51Common Market Law Review 6. 
60 Supra note 57,Digital Rights Ireland judgment, para 27. 
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 Therefore, the Court ruled that the obligations deriving from the Directive to 
retain data as well as the access to that data by the MS’s authorities constituted an 
interference with the right to privacy and, since the Directive was also providing for 
processing of personal data, it violated the right to the protection of personal data. 
 In relation to the justification of the infringement, the CJEU examined the 
proportionality of the violation pursuant to Article 52(1) EUCFR and stressed that the 
essence of the rights at stake was respected. Subsequently, it attempted to ascertain 
whether the Data Retention Directive fulfilled an objective of general interest and did 
not go beyond what was suitable to achieve its purpose, concluding that, under the 
circumstances of the present case, the Directive fulfilled this purpose.     
 With regard to the examination of the final element of necessity of the 
proportionality test, the CJEU reiterated that derogations from fundamental rights 
should be accepted only when strictly necessary and held that the Directive did not 
provide clear and precise rules regarding the extent of the interference.61  The EU 
legislature did not require a clear and strong connection between the data retained and 
serious crime or public security. 62 Additionally, the Directive failed to designate 
particular substantive and procedural conditions delimitating the access and use of the 
data retained by competent national authorities.63 Regarding data security, the Directive 
lacked clear safeguards for the protection of the retained data. Moreover, the Directive 
abstained from clarifying that the data must be retained within the European Union and, 
therefore, within the scope of control of national Data Protection Authorities.  On these 
grounds, the Directive was declared ab initio invalid by the Court. 
 The Court, for the first time, blatantly used the EU Charter as a vehicle to strike 
down an entire EU Directive and to put severe pressure on EU institutions in order to 
modify the legal context of the retention of data, confirming the tremendous 
significance of the protection of privacy and data protection within the EU.  
 The first and more practical consequence of this milestone judgment relies on 
its immediate effect. Since the Court’s judgment manifestly declared the data retention 
legal scheme as incompatible with the EU Charter, all legislative measures adopted by 
the member states in the aim of implementation of the said Directive will not bear 
                                                          
61 Ibid., para 56. 
62 Ibid., para 59. 
63 Ibid., para 64. 
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judicial scrutiny. Thus, as Federico Fabbrini noted, “the effects of the ECJ judgment, 
therefore, are likely to spill over into the national legal system, ensuring a new advanced 
standard of protection for privacy and personal data throughout the EU”.64 
 During the last decades, the European judicial fora were repeatedly confronted 
with cases in which human rights were clashing with public interest objectives. As for 
the reasoning which the Court did provide, the surprising aspect of the CJEU’s appraisal 
is that the Court clearly makes a distinction between the two: respecting the very 
essence of a right is not sufficient because even if the latter is respected, the legislation 
at stake can still be disproportionate. 
 Another significant element of the Digital Rights Ireland ruling is, as Steve 
Peers correctly stressed, “the development of a doctrine indicating when strict scrutiny 
of the EU legislature’s interference with fundamental rights should apply.”65  That 
definitely relies on the ECtHR’s relevant jurisprudence, cited many times by the Court 
in the course of its reasoning.66 Nevertheless, the application of the EU Charter by the 
CJEU gave the opportunity to the latter to raise even more the standards posed by its 
Strasbourg peer which, clearly served as “springboard” for the development of the 
CJEU’s case law in this field as it expanded significantly the application of Art.8 
ECHR.67 
 All that said, this ruling definitely laid the ground for a stricter scrutiny 
exercised by the Luxembourg Court particularly in cases in which digital rights are at 
stake. In this respect, despite the definite impact of the ECtHR, the Charter appears to 
be the true game-changer, a development also reaffirmed by another milestone data 
protection case, the Facebook case or the Schrems case,68 delivered by the CJEU in 
2015.  
 
                                                          
64Fabrini F., ‘Human Rights in the digital age, The European Court of Justice ruling in the Data Retention 
Case and its lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the U.S.’, Tilburg Law School Studies Research 
Paper Series No15/2014,<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482212>,accessed 14 
October 2017 ,26. 
65Peers S., ‘The data retention judgment: The CJEU prohibits mass surveillance’ (2014) EU Law Analysis 
Blog<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.fr/2014/04/the-data-retention-judgment-cjeu.html>accessed 15 
October 2017 
66Supra note 57, Digital Rights Ireland,paras 35, 47, 54–55  
67Petkova B., ‘Towards an Internal Hierarch y of Values in the EU Legal Order, Balancing the Freedom 
of Speech and Data Privacy’[2016]23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 3, 431. 
68 Case C-362/14,Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650   . 
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iii. Schrems: paving the way for new data protection standards in the era of 
social networks 
 
 In light of the Edward Snowden revelations and the heating discussion on mass 
surveillance conducted by US intelligence services, Maximillian Schrems, an Austrian 
national and a Facebook user, addressed a complaint to the Irish DPA arguing that his 
transferred personal data were subject to mass surveillance in the USA. The legal basis 
of such transfers of personal data was the EU/US ‘Safe Harbour’ agreement, reaching 
back in 2000. The said agreement was built upon a Commission decision adopted under 
the Data Protection Directive which declared the United States as an adequate 
destination for personal data.  
 The Irish data protection authority refused to pronounce on the applicant’s 
complaint, so he challenged subsequently the DPA’s decision before the Irish High 
Court, which clearly expressed doubt that the “Safe Harbour” legal framework was 
compatible with EU law. It addressed, thus, a preliminary question to the CJEU asking 
whether the DPAs of Member States should have the power to oppose data transfers to 
the US in similar cases.  
 The CJEU dealt first with the conditions under which a country is declared 
adequate for data transfers and, then, in case of declared adequacy as in the case under 
discussion, upon the competence of the national authorities to control these transfers.69 
 Addressing the first issue, in line with the Opinion of the AG,70 the Court ruled 
that the term adequate level of protection of the Data Protection Directive should be 
interpreted as “requiring the third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic 
law or its international commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU.”71Additionally, 
the CJEU relied on the independent character of the DPAs in order to reaffirm the 
ongoing obligation of the European Commission or competent DPA to review any 
adequacy decision in light of any changes in circumstances having arisen in the 
aftermath of the decision's adoption. The challenged decision failed to guarantee a 
                                                          
69 For an analysis of the background of the case see Cohen N., ‘The privacy follies : a look back at the 
CJEU’s invalidation of the EU/US Safe Harbor  Framework’ [2015] 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 240. 
70 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 23 September 2015. 
71 Supra note 68, Schrems case, para 73. 
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sufficient level of data protection in the US equivalent to the one designated by the EU 
data protection law requirements.  
 Therefore, the CJEU underlined that provisions of the Data Protection Directive 
must be applied in conformity with the fundamental human rights as ensured by the EU 
Charter and, most importantly, with the rights to a private and family life, the protection 
of personal data, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. In this regard, despite 
the fact that the Commission’s decisions “are in principle presumed to be lawful and 
accordingly produce legal effects until such time as they are withdrawn, annulled in an 
action for annulment or declared invalid following a reference for a preliminary ruling 
or a plea of illegality(...) a Commission decisionadopted pursuant to Article 25(6) of 
Directive 95/46, such as Decision 2000/520, cannot prevent persons whose personal 
data has been or could be transferred to a third country from lodging with the national 
supervisory authorities a claim” and hence, “a decision of that nature cannot eliminate 
or reduce the powers expressly accorded to the national supervisory authorities by 
Article 8(3) of the Charter and Article 28 of the directive.”72In the context of the limits 
of mass surveillance declared in its prior Digital Rights judgment, the additional 
element of the absence of effective judicial redress was not compatible with the EU 
Charter either.  
Thus, according to the Court’s reasoning, the restriction of the DPAs 
competence when reviewing data transfers in order to determine whether the level of 
data protection in the USA within the context of the Safe Harbour Agreement is 
adequate or not, was also considered as another legal flaw of the EU Commission’s 
Decision. All that said, the Court of Justice invalidated in its entirety the contested 
decision. 
 When shedding light to the basic aspects of the case, it is more than evident that, 
following the Court’s findings in Google Spain and Digital Rights Ireland, the Court 
now declares that even when a separate regime regulating external transfers is under 
scrutiny, an almost identical level of protection is required so as to guarantee 
compatibility with the EU Charter’s provision related to data protection. However, as 
Steve Peers correctly observed, “with respect, the Court’s interpretation is not 
convincing, since the word ‘adequate’ suggests something less than ‘essentially 
                                                          
72 Ibid.,paras 52,53 
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equivalent’, and the EU Charter does not bind third States. But having said that, the 
American rules on mass surveillance would violate even a far more generous 
interpretation of the meaning of the word ‘adequate’.”73 
 The CJEU’s standing not only reveals its belief that, in the post-Lisbon era, an 
even higher level of data protection is required under the Charter, but reflects its 
position in favour of an extended protection regarding data transfers to third countries, 
introducing, thus, an extraterritorial effect of the Charter’s provisions in relation to 
digital rights. 
 The Court takes the right to privacy so seriously that reaches the conclusion that 
extended access to personal data by public authorities and law enforcement authorities, 
even in the name of national security, affects  the “essence” of the right to private life 
under Art. 7 EU Charter. In this respect, no proportionality test or balancing exercise 
involving other rights and freedoms is required as far as the core of this right is 
breached.74 
 In conclusion, despite the criticism initially raised against the Court of Justice 
for not taking fundamental rights seriously enough and its reluctance in producing bold 
judgments in this field, post Lisbon, its case law on the Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
reveals its tendency to be a frontrunner in data protection law, particularly in “the digital 
age”. However, this task is certainly not a walk in the park. In fact, the CJEU’s position 
on the matter needs to be further clarified, especially in view of the Court’s active 
interaction with its Strasbourg peer in this field. 
 
 
C. Willems case: a U-turn of the CJEU with regard to biometric data? 
 
While the evolution of the CJEU jurisprudence on the matter was already 
accomplished and –for that reason- incorporated in the recently adopted new EU 
General Data Protection Regulation, applicable as of May 2018 and aiming to fully 
                                                          
73 Peers S.,‘The party’s over: EU data protection law after the Schrems Safe Harbour judgment’, EU law 
analysis Blog [2015]<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.gr/2015/10/the-partys-over-eu-data-protection-
law.html>accessed 14 October 2017. 
74Nonetheless, it is striking how the Luxembourg Court concluded to a violation of the essence of right 
to private life under Art.7 EUCFR but not to a violation of the essence of the right to the protection of 
personal data as enshrined in Article 8.  
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harmonise the overlapping data protection rules within the EU, a recent judgment of 
the CJEU came to shake the waters in relation with the protection of the most sensitive 
type of data, namely the biometric data. 
Hence, the Willems ruling of the Luxembourg Court75contributed an alarming 
approach with regard to biometric data used for issuing passports and identity cards in 
the EU, in clear contradiction with its prior expansive interpretation of the EU data 
protection soft law and of the relevant EU Charter provisions. This particular issue is 
mostly regulated by the Regulation No. 2252/2004 (hereinafter ‘Passport Regulation’) 
76, amended by Regulation No. 444/2009.77 According to the latter, the collection, 
storage and processing of biometric data is targeted only in verifying the authenticity 
of the travel document or the identity of the holder of such document. The case at hand 
arose when the applicants, Dutch nationals, after filing their passport applications 
refused to provide the competent authorities with their fingerprints due to the fact that, 
under the Netherlands Passport law, the biometric data collected for that purpose are 
also transferred and stored in a decentralized database in order to be further used for 
national security or judicial purposes. As a result, Mr. Willems and others challenged 
the rejection of their applications before the Dutch Courts on fundamental rights 
grounds. Besides the practical implications that the lack of identity cards had in the 
daily routine of the applicants, the latter claimed inter alia that the retention and further 
use of their fingerprint data raised severe privacy concerns and violated their 
fundamental rights under Article 7 and 8 of the EU Charter. The national court referred 
two questions to the CJEU for preliminary ruling. 
The said questions raised, firstly, the issue whether the Passport Regulation is 
applicable to certain types of identity cards regardless their period of validity. The latter 
plays a central role for the Dutch identity cards’ consideration as travel documents 
according to the spirit of the aforesaid Regulation. Secondly, pursuant to the applicants’ 
allegations, the CJEU was called to pronounce on whether the re-use for other purposes 
                                                          
75 Joined Cases C‑446/12 to C‑449/12, W.P. Willems  v Burgemeester van Nuth and H.J. Kooistra v 
Burgemeester van Skarsterlân, and M. Roest V Burgemeester van Amsterdam, and L.J.A. van Luijk v 
Burgemeester van Den Haag,[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:238. 
76Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and 
biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States [2004] OJ L 385/1. 
77Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the  European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2009 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States[2009] OJ L 142/1.  
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of biometric data originally collected for the issuance of passports is compatible with 
the EU data protection legislation and with Art.7 and 8 of the EU Charter.    
At the outset, the Luxembourg Court focused persistently its reasoning on the 
wording of the Regulation which provides that provided that “identity cards issued to 
[Member States’] nationals or to temporary passports and travel documents having a 
validity of 12 months or less”. The Court interpreted this particular provision as having 
no application on national identity cards and, thus, Dutch identity cards fall outside the 
scope of the Regulation, neglecting not only the fact that they also serve as travel 
documents within the EU, but also their period of validity which lasts for five years. 
As for the second question, the Court concluded that it cannot rule on the further 
use of biometric data of passports since the latter fall outside the purposes of this 
Regulation and, therefore, subject to regulation by national law. For that reason, the 
Court shockingly came to the conclusion that since the potential re-use of such data by 
national authorities is not governed by the said Passport Regulation, the EU Charter is 
not applicable either, despite the fact that such a process might be in violation of the 
ECHR.  
Finally, the Court refrained to pronounce on the compatibility of national law 
with Art.6 and 7 of the Data Protection Directive78 on the grounds that only the correct 
interpretation of the Passport Regulation was at stake in the present case. 
                                                          
78Article 6 of the Data Protection Directive provides that: “1. Member States shall provide that personal 
data must be: (a) processed fairly and lawfully;(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes 
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member 
States provide appropriate safeguards;(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which they are collected and/or further processed; 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that 
data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or 
for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified;(e) kept in a form which permits identification 
of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for 
which they are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data 
stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.2. It shall be for the controller to ensure 
that paragraph 1 is complied with.Article 7 reads as follows : “Member States shall provide that personal 
data may be processed only if:(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or (b) processing 
is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps 
at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; or (c) processing is necessary for 
compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or (d) processing is necessary in 
order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or(e) processing is necessary for the performance 
of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller 
or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the 
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are 
disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject which require protection under Article 1 (1)”. 
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Consequently, the Willems ruling constitutes a step back from the previously 
discussed jurisprudential progress in the field of data protection. Notably, the Court, in 
contradiction with its modus operandi in previous similar cases, insisted on the wording 
of the referred questions in order to restrict its own competence.79Looking at the 
previous CJEU’s case law, the Court paradoxically misses the chance to elaborate on 
the intriguing questions of the national Court, particularly in the light of the Charter’s 
standards. Besides its prior data protection case law, it’s only in its Schwarz ruling in 
2013 80 when the CJEU examined the storage of fingerprints under the Passport 
Regulation in the light of Art.7 and 8 of the Charter and concluded that such a use of 
biometric data does not constitute a disproportionate interference with the right to 
private life and the right to data protection respectively, as enshrined in the EU Charter. 
In any case, the mere fact that the applicants invoked the Passport Regulation brought 
the matter under the scope of EU law and, thereby, of the Charter since the use of 
biometric data in the new generation of passports relies on an EU obligation.81 
In addition to this, the unwillingness of the Court to redraft the question on the 
compatibility with the Data Protection Directive in order to avoid addressing the issue 
already raised by the national Court “simply departs from reality”.82 
 
IIΙ. Conclusions 
 
Under the pressure of proliferation of data mining techniques, developing 
increasingly intrusive implications in individuals’ private life, the legal protection of 
personal data calls for a systematic and articulate legal regulation. 
The concept of privacy as captured under Article 8 of the ECHR, in correlation 
with the right to data protection as enshrined in the EU Charter (Article 8), point 
towards an enhanced protection,  that could equip the EU Courts with valuable tools in 
order to review more effectively EU data protection legislation.  
                                                          
79 Wisman T., ‘Willems: Giving Member States the Prints and Data Protection the Finger’, 1 Eur. Data 
Prot. L. Rev. 245,2015. 
80 Case C‑291/12, Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:670. 
81 Supra note 6,Hornung. 
82 Peers S., ‘Biometric data and data protection law: the CJEU loses the plot’, EU Law Analysis blog 
[2015]<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.gr/2015/04/biometric-data-and-data-protection-law.html>, 
accessed 14 October 2017.  
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Notwithstanding the strict scrutiny with regard to the use of personal data 
exercised by the Luxembourg Court and its effort to walk hand-in-hand with its 
Strasbourg counterpart on the matter, the Court seemed in Willems case to consider the 
fate of biometric data collected as completely irrelevant to the EU legal framework.  
Regardless of what the impact of this judgment might be in the foreseeable 
future, it raises great concerns pertaining to the actual enjoyment of the right to private 
life or the protection of the most sensitive personal data, namely the biometric ones. 
Most importantly, in the era of mass surveillance and “big data”, both the European 
judicial mechanisms are now engaged in building a more solid legal shelter for the 
collection, storage and processing of such data.83 Hence, leaving the further use of 
biometric data of EU citizens unattended might open progressively the Pandora’s box 
for uncontrolled misuse or abuse of data containing biological information of 
individuals. The new General Data Protection Regulation does not seem to respond 
sufficiently to this ever-growing anxiety and in this respect, it is largely criticized by 
numerous scholars even before its entry into force.84 
Thus, automated profiling or data mining practices, which when intensively 
applied, might offer a great deal of benefits in the field of scientific research, might also 
constitute a threat to private life if the EU or international institutions continue to avoid 
verging into this whole new territory. The viability and efficiency, therefore, of a 
comprehensive regulatory regime addressing these newly emerging challenges will 
largely depend on its appraisal by involved legislative and judicial bodies. 
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